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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
COURTS
CORAM NOBIS, PROHIBITION, AND APPEAL
Continuing the long series of proceedings following his conviction
for murder 20 years ago, D. C. Stephenson by petition for writ of
error coram obis asserted that he should have another trial. The
State, through the Attorney General sought a writ of prohibition to
restrain the circuit court from acting upon the writ. HeW, writ denied
and rule of court established permitting appeal by the State from an
order granting or denying a petition for writ of error coram nobis.
State v. Hamilton Circuit Court -, Ind. , 61 N.E. (2d) 182
(1945).
The instant case decided under difficult circumstances goes far
toward clarifying the law of prohibition in Indiana and bringing its
rule in accord with the weight of authority.1
It is clear that the circuit court has jurisdiction.2 It must be
assumed that the circuit court will exercise that jurisdiction properly.
Thus, the present action does not appear to fall within the statutory
ground for prohibition to restrain and confine "such courts to their
respective, lawful jurisdiction" or to-compel "the performance of any
duty enjoined by law."3 Thus, unless the court was prepared to give
undue significance to the single sentence of the section which reads
"Writs of mandate and prohibition may issue out of the Supreme and
Appellate Courts of this state in aid of the appellate powers and
functions of said courts, respectively," 4 the decision is obviously sound.5
Having gone this far in returning prohibition to its proper limits,
1. High, Extraordinary Legal Initations § 770; Comment 22 Calif.
L. Rev. 537 (1934); Note 36 Harv. L. Rev. 863 (1923).
2. " . . . the object of the writ of prohibition is to prevent a court
of peculiar, limited or inferior jurisdiction from assuming juris-
diction of a matter beyond its legal cognizance." Smith v. Whit-
ney, 116 U.S. 167 (1886).
3. Ind. Ann. Stat. Burn's (1923) § 3-2201.
4. The practice in federal courts is consistent with the decision in
the instant case. Thus the phrase in 262 of the Judicial Code-
"necessary to the exercise of their respective jurisdiction"--has
been interpreted as limiting the Supreme Court and Circuit Courts
of Appeals to cases where they would be deprived of appellatejurisdiction. Keaton v. Kennamer, 42 Fed. 2d. 814 (1930). The
phrase has not been used by the courts affirmatively as a reason
for taking jurisdiction, see Note 43, Col. L. Rev. 899, 002 (1934)
cf Note 42 Col. L. Rev. 295 (1942).
5. Cf. Irwin v. State, 220 Ind. 228, 41 N.E. (2d) 809
(1942) criticized in Note 22 BU L. Rev. 600 (1942). For a
general history of the writ of error coram nobis see Freeman,
the Writ of Error coram nobis, 3 Temple L. Q. 365 (1939); Com-
ment 11 Wis. L. Rev. 248 (1936); Note 19 Neb. L.B. 150 (1940);
Note 8 Ind. L.J. 247 (1933); 18 Chi. Kent L. Rev. 304 (1940);
Note 6 J. Marshall's L. Q. 304 (1940).
Newly discovered evidence has been sufficient for the issu-
ance of the writ. Jones v. Commonwealth, 269 Ky. 799, 108 S.W.(2d) 816 (1937) Discussed in 31 Ky. L. J. 86 (1942); but see
People v. Dabbs, 372 Ill. 160, 23 N.E. (2) 343 (1939).
6. "The use of two extraordinary limitations is thus sought to pre-
vent the anticipated abuse of the other. Each has its proper
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it is to be regretted that the court did not continue the clarifying
processes to the point of overruling the now inconsistent decision of
State ex rel Fry v. Superior Court.7
Of much greater importance to the development of dynamic ju-
dicial leadership is that portion of the opinion which recognized that
the denial of the writ might, in turn, prejudice the interests of the
state.8
To guard the State against such hazards the court adopted a rule
providing for state appeal from orders granting or denying petitions
for writ of error coram nobis.9 This is exactly the type of action
which the legislature must have intended when it withdrew from the
field of procedural legislation.1o It is the type of action which the
bar most certainly commends for it permits the court to establish rules
which will protect the interests of all parties concerned without per-
verting the normal application of established procedures in order to
provide satisfactory results in particular cases.
In the principal case the Supreme Court points out that an order
denying a writ of error coram nobis had been held to be a final judg-
ment from which an appeal was allowed. The Court emphasizes the
fact that the new rule changes the law on this point and that in such
a case the appeal must now be perfected and briefed as an appeal from
an interlocutory order.
The Supreme Court's action in extending the privilege of appeal
to an interlocutory order granting a writ of error coram nobis sug-
gests that consideration might well be given to a similar extension in
other fields. The privilege of appeal from interlozutory orders in
Indiana is a very restricted one and there are undoubtedly other
instances where provision for appeal might well be nade.
function. Neither should be perverted." State v. Hamilton Cir-
cuit Court - Ind. -, 61 N.E. (2d) 182 (1945).
7. 205 Ind. 355, 186 N.E. 310 (1933).
8. "Relators are aware of the difficulties of marshalling in 1945
evidence to prove facts that existed and were susceptible of proof
in 1925. They fear the possibility of an erroneous ruling by
respondent court resulting in the unwarranted release of a guilty
convict" who has already brought 39 separate proceedings includ-
ing six petitions for writs of error coram nobis and habeas corpus
actions upon the same subject matter. State v. Hamilton Circuit
Court. Supra n. 6.
9. "RULE 2-40. An appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court
from an order granting or denying a petition for writ of error
coram nobis. The sufficiency of the pleadings and of the evidence
to entitle the petitioner to the writ will be cortsidered upon an
assignment of error that the order is contrary to law. The tran-
script of so much of the record as is necessary to present all
questions raised by appellant's proposition shall be filed with the
Clerk of the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days after the
date of the order. The provisions of Rule 2-15 applicable to ap-
peals from interlocutory orders shall govern as to the time of
filing briefs. All proceedings in the lower court shall be stayed
until the appeal is determined. This rule shall apply to any order
made on or after May 29, 1945, granting or denying a petition
for writ of error coram nobis."
10. Ind. Ann. Stat. (Burn's Supp., 1942) § 2-4718.
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